Masters and commanders : how Roosevelt, Churchill, Marshall, and Alanbrooke won the war in the West / Andrew Roberts
Material type: TextPublication details: New York : Harper , 2009, c2008.Description: xl, 673 p., [16] p. of plates : ill., maps ; 24 cmISBN:- 9780061228575
- 940.54 ROB
- D736 .R63 2008
Item type | Current library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Libro - Monografía | Biblioteca Pública de San Miguel de Allende, A.C. | 940.54 ROB (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Available | 014897 |
Originally published: London : Allen Lane, 2008.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 589-624) and index.
An epic joint biography, Masters and Commanders explores the degree to which the course of the Second World War turned on the relationships and temperaments of four of the strongest personalities of the twentieth century: political masters Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt and the commanders of their armed forces, General Sir Alan Brooke and General George C. Marshall. Each was exceptionally tough willed and strong minded, and each was certain that he knew best how to win the war. Yet each knew that he had to win at least two of the others if he was to have his strategy adopted. Andrew Roberts, whom The Economist calls "Britain's finest contemporary military historian," traces the mutual suspicion and admiration, the rebuffs and the charm, the often-explosive disagreements and wary reconciliations, and he helps us to appreciate the motives and imperatives acting upon these key leaders struggling to destroy Nazism. Drawing on newly discovered verbatim accounts of Churchill's war-cabinet meetings and on the private papers of nearly seventy contemporaries, Roberts reconstructs the lively debates of the four principals and other leading figures, and attempts to answer some of the key questions of Allied strategy. Why, when the most direct route from Germany to Britain was through north-western France, did the Western Allies launch attacks via North Africa, Sicily, and Rome? Why, if Operation Overlord in June 1944 was intended to be the start of the Allies' great thrust into Germany, did four hundred thousand men land five hundred miles to the south, in southern France, two months later? Why did the Allies not take Berlin, Vienna, or Prague and allow the Iron Curtain to descend where it did? Masters and Commanders dramatically re-creates the atmosphere, debates, and maneuverings through which Allied grand strategy was forged and reveals the profound impact of personality upon history.
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